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This study investigates whether participants use categorical or individual knowledge
about others in order to make cooperative decisions in an adaptation of the trust game
paradigm. Concretely, participants had to choose whether to cooperate or not with
black and white unknown partners as a function of expected partners’ reciprocity rates.
Reciprocity rates were manipulated by associating three out of four members of an ethnic
group (blacks or whites consistent members) with high (or low) reciprocity rates, while
the remaining member of the ethnic group is associated with the reciprocity of the other
ethnic group (inconsistent member). Results show opposite performance’s patterns for
white and black partners. Participants seemed to categorize white partners, by making
the same cooperation decision with all the partners, that is, they cooperated equally with
consistent and inconsistent white partners. However, this effect was not found for black
partners, suggesting a tendency to individuate them. Results are discussed in light of the
implications of these categorization-individuation processes for intergroup relations and
cooperative economic behavior.
Keywords: trust game, categorization, individuation, ingroup–outgroup perception, cooperation
INTRODUCTION
Every day we come across many people. The amount of information that we can extract from these
encounters can be so demanding that it needs to be organized in order to be used formaking efficient
decisions and plan our subsequent actions toward those people. Such organization of the information
provides us with general knowledge about the individuals we intend to interact with. At the same
time, this knowledge helps us guiding our interactions even with strangers.
When perceiving a person for the first time we may categorize him/her according to the salient
features of his/her face such as sex, age, or ethnicity (Devine, 1989; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990).
Research shows that people use stereotypes to attribute characteristics to others and consequently the
impressions we form about them can be biased by those stereotypes. Interestingly, this process can
take place outside the individual’s awareness (Bargh and Williams, 2006; Cunningham and Zelazo,
2007).
Social perception may involve a decision-making process where social agents decide whom
to interact with and how. Perceivers try to predict the course of the interaction and whether the
goals of the interaction will be achieved or not. In social contexts, this decision-making process is
influenced by certain salient features of the people we interact with, such as facial expressions (e.g.,
Scharlemann et al., 2001; Ruz andTudela, 2011), physical attractiveness (e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer,
1999; Solnick, 2001), or ethnicity (e.g., Sommers, 2006, 2007), which may influence our beliefs and
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expectations about those with whom we have to interact (e.g.,
Ruz et al., 2011; Gaertig et al., 2012), especially when we know
nothing about them. One of the most crucial features when
interacting with others concerns the level of trust deployed in
these relationships. Trust is essential for a secure andhealthy social
life (Dunning et al., 2014), being considered as a core socialmotive
(Fiske, 2003).
Although essential to social life, trust is conceived as irrational
by philosophers (e.g., Hobbes, 1997; Machiavelli, 1515/2003) or
neoclassical economists (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Bolle, 1998).
Despite that, empirical evidence has shown that people trust
strangers and reward that trust (for reviews, see Johnson and
Mislin, 2011; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013).
Outside the lab, trust is present in interpersonal situations
(trusting a confidant), in economic markets (trusting a financial
advisor), or even in political elections (trusting a government).
Knowing whom to trust is crucial for preventing being deceived
by others, being taken advantage of, or avoiding financial losses,
and many other undesirable outcomes. When we have previous
experience with our partner, the object of our trust, we can predict
at different levels of certainty whether we can trust him/her, and
in fact minimal interactions can already influence trustworthiness
judgments (Frank et al., 1993). However, when we lack this
previous experience with somebody it is difficult (although not
impossible) to predict his/her behavior and consequently trust
or not him/her1. However, trust at zero acquaintance has to
be influenced by factors different from the experience with the
trustee (Dunning et al., 2014).
Some research has focused on some of these factors that
may influence participants trusting behavior. Among these, there
is an emerging literature pointing to the role of shared group
membership in the promotion of trust (Platow et al., 2012). Much
of this work follow the theoretical claim by Brewer (1981, p.
356) that group membership “serves as a rule for defining the
boundaries of low-risk interpersonal trust that bypasses the need
for personal knowledge and the costs of negotiating reciprocity.”
This proposition has been supported by the results of some studies
showing that participants trust others as a function of their group
membership (e.g., Tanis and Postmes, 2005), although it is not
supported by results from other studies, as we will describe later
(Tortosa et al., 2013).
As in many other impression formation processes, when
deciding to trust unfamiliar others, we can either: (a) categorize
them and interact with them according to the inferences that
can be extracted from what we know (or have learnt) about
their category (i.e., their inferred group membership), or (b)
to individuate them and try to predict their behavior in order
to know how to interact with them based solely on what we
specifically learnt about them. Literature has repeatedly shown
that categorization seem to be the default process in particular for
social stimuli (Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Kawakami
et al., 1998; Cuddy et al., 2004; Nelson, 2005).
In the present study we were interested in evaluating whether
people infer information (i.e., reciprocation rate) about others
1Trusting behavior is the willingness of an individual to expose themselves to
the actions of others while trustworthy behavior is defined to be rewarding
trust through reciprocation.
based primarily on their category membership (i.e., ethnicity)
or on individuation perception, and consequentially their
decision to trust them (e.g., sharing money) depends on these
reciprocation inferences. In order to do so, we adapted a
procedure developed to investigate the use of social categories
for the allocation of attentional control (Canadas et al., 2013), to
investigate the categorization-individuation processes underlying
the cooperation dynamics in a trust game context.
Canadas et al. (2013) procedure presented photographs of men
and women as the context in which congruent or incongruent
stimuli appeared for participants to solve a flanker task.
Three faces in each social category (i.e., consistent faces) were
associated either with a high proportion of congruent trials (75%
congruent–25% incongruent, i.e., a low conflict context) or a low
proportion of congruent trials (25% congruent–75% incongruent,
i.e., a high conflict context). Whereas a forth face in each
group (i.e., inconsistent face) was associated to the proportion
congruent of the other group. The extent to which inconsistent
faces produced the same pattern of results as consistent ones, in
spite of being associated to the opposite proportion of congruency
as the social category they belonged to, was taken as an index
of social categorization. A categorization pattern was observed
in fact in the first study, thus supporting the abovementioned
idea that categorization processes seem to be the default for social
stimuli.
In a second study, we manipulated the instructions given
to participants, either to individuate (i.e., pay attention to the
individual characteristics of the faces) or categorize (i.e., pay
attention to the category-based features of the faces). The previous
pattern of results was replicated in the categorization instructions
group. However, the pattern of results in the individuation
instructions group showed that different effects were observed for
consistent and inconsistent faces, thus reflecting the individual
association rather than the group associations between faces and
the proportion of congruency. This pattern was taken as evidence
for individuation even in social contexts when participants are
motivated to do so.
In conclusion, although categorization seems to play a
dominant role in person perception processing, a wide range of
variables has been shown to function as modulators of categorical
thinking activation, including instructions, motivation, goals, and
strategies (e.g., Lepore and Brown, 1997; Castelli et al., 2004;
Macrae and Cloutier, 2009); the paper by Canadas et al. (2013)
showed to be a suitable method to investigate these processes.
In the current study we aimed at extending this procedure
to investigate individuation-categorization processes in a more
direct and clear social behavior, the decisions about to trust or not
a partner in an economic game.
Wilson and Kayatani (1968) examined the effect of a partner’s
ethnicity on cooperation behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
They found that participants were far more cooperative with
ingroup partners than with outgroup partners. Also, Chen
et al. (2010) performed several experiments using the prisoner’s
dilemma task in which participants identify themselves as
members of the same university of the same ethnicity, and showed
the same pattern of results as Wilson and Kayatani (1968), that is,
the sense of belonging to the same group played an important role
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 15682
Cañadas et al. Trust and social categorization
in the participants’ cooperation ratings. However, Tortosa et al.
(2013) did not find evidence for this bias against the outgroup
with the well-known Trust Game paradigm developed by Berg
et al. (1995), originally constructed by Camerer and Weigelt
(1988). In a first experiment Tortosa et al. (2013) observed no
effect of ethnicity on the cooperation rate, whereas in the second
experiment they observed in fact a smaller but reliable tendency
toward a larger cooperation rate for the outgroup partners (64.4%)
compared to the ingroup ones (57.5%).
In the current research we used a modified version of this
trust game procedure and incorporated the Canadas et al.’s (2013)
manipulation to investigate categorization and individuation
processes. We evaluated whether participants prefer to trust
(cooperate/share money with) ingroup members (i.e., white
partners), compared to outgroup members (black partners). The
task typically involves two players, a trustor and a trustee. The
trustor (participant) is endowed with a sum of money and has
to decide whether or not to share it with her/his game partner.
If s/he decides to keep the money for her/himself, the trustee gets
nothing. If s/he decides to share themoney, the trustee receives the
initial endowment multiplied by an amount (determined by the
experimenter). If the trustee then reciprocates, the sum is divided
between the two players; otherwise the trustor obtains nothing.
In this game, the typical decision of the trustor is hazardous
because the trustee’s reciprocation is not enforced by the rules.
Still, substantial amounts of trust are observed across studies
(Berg et al., 1995). These effects are attributed more to “social
preferences” such as fairness, altruism, and reciprocation (see, for
example; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2002, 2003; Fehr and Camerer, 2007) than to
self-interest rational choices.
Importantly in our adaptation of the procedure, each
participant was presented with two categories of faces (i.e.,
blacks and whites) of supposed partners randomly assigned
to a high (75%) or low (25%) proportion of reciprocation in
a within subject design. Also, as in Canadas et al. (2013) we
manipulated that one individual in each group (inconsistent
member) is associated with the proportion of reciprocation of
the other group. This will allow us to examine different effects of
impression formation (participant’s cooperation bias). Another
advantage of using a within subject design is that it allows us to
explore the learning processes underlying participants’ strategy
to adapt their sharing behavior with high reciprocation vs. low
reciprocation partners.
A second and more important aim of our study is to
evaluate whether participants individuate, or rather categorize,
that is, the extent to which participant behave in the same
way with all category members, irrespectively of whether they
show a consistent or inconsistent cooperation rate with rest
of the category members. In case of categorization, the same
decision (e.g., to cooperate with the members of one ethnic
group) will be displayed also with inconsistent members of the
group (that is, even with those whose reciprocation rates are
opposite to the one of their own ethnic-category, and equal
to the other ethnic-category). On the contrary, participants
will individuate to the extent that their decisions are taken
accordingly to the reciprocation rate associated to each individual
face rather than to the ethnic-category. Therefore, in case of
individuation, inconsistent individuals will be show different
cooperation patterns than consistent faces.
We expected that along the block of trials, participants would
use the facial features to categorize individuals according to the
more salient features of their faces (i.e., ethnic features) and
therefore decide to cooperate or not with them depending on the
likelihood of their group to reciprocate. Thus, participants would
share in greater extent with the individuals of the group more
likely to reciprocate. However, we expected this to happen mainly
for consistent individuals.
A different prediction was made for inconsistent individuals.
On the one hand, and according to our previous research by
Canadas et al. (2013), inconsistent individuals might be also
categorized. However, given the nature of the task (Trust Game
round) when participants interact several times with the same
partner, previous interaction with the same person influences
the participant’s decision to cooperate (King-Casas et al., 2005).
Foregoing research has demonstrated that people attempting to
maximize their benefits should learn from the feedback displayed
after the interactions with the environment (reinforcement
learning—Sutton and Barto, 1998) and consequently in our study
individuation is a more efficient strategy. This strategy then
should be learned quickly after the feedback of each interaction
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
Taken all together, both the individualistic nature of this
task and the explicit consequences of each decision (participants
were informed about whether the partner reciprocated or
not in each trial), we expected that participant would pay
attention to each individual and therefore would individuate
inconsistent partners, updating first impressions based on
previous interactions (Chang et al., 2010; Campellone and Kring,
2013). This individuation pattern (i.e., a correlation between the
participants cooperation rate and the individual reciprocation
rate, nor the group reciprocation rate) was expected nevertheless
mainly for the ingroup individuals (i.e., white partners), thus
supporting previous knowledge on outgroup vs. ingroup social
categorization (Judd and Park, 1988; Linville et al., 1989; Levin,
1996, 2000; MacLin and Malpass, 2001).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate white students from the University of
Granada (oneman, mean age 20.15 years, SD= 1.93) participated
in exchange for course credits. The study was conformed to
the relevant regulatory standards approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Granada in the Department of
Experimental Psychology. Participants signed consent forms and
received 1% of the final payoffs (maximum 10 euros).
Stimuli and Procedure
At the beginning of the session, participants were instructed that
the experiment explored the cooperation patterns that emerge
between people during the so-called trust game. During the task
participants played the role of “trustors.” They received 1 euro and
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the procedure used during the trust game task.
had to decide whether to keep or share it with an allegedly partner
(i.e., the “trustee”), an unknown person for the participant from
whom a picture is shown. Each trail starts with the Euro’s symbol
(€)—indicating that he/she receives 1 euro, and the participant has
to decide whether to keep it (by pressing the 0 on the keyboard)
or share it with their partner (by pressing 1 on the keyboard).
Deciding to keep the money would yield no earnings for the
partner and would end the trial. If participants decide to share,
it would result in 5 euros given to the trustee, who, in turn, would
decide whether: (a) to reciprocate the cooperation, and each of
them would receive 2.5€, or (b) not to reciprocate, and the trustee
would keep the 5€ but the participant would receive nothing. This
feedback about the trustee decisionwas displayed on the computer
screen 500 ms after the participant took the decision and the trial
ended after the feedback. The participants’ goal was to maximize
their payoffs in the game.
Participants were also informed that they were not playing
with real people but that the reciprocity behavior would mimic
common patterns of play by real people. Participants were not
informed about the different manipulations included in the
design: the ethnicity of the interaction partners or the partner’s
reciprocation rate. Therefore they were unaware of the main
goal of the study, which was to explore how the ethnicity of the
partners can influence strategies of cooperation, and to investigate
whether participants categorize vs. individuate the outgroup vs.
the ingroup trustees.
The general procedure was similar to that used by Tortosa
et al. (2013). The task was presented on a PC running E-prime
software (Schneider et al., 2002). Stimuli were frontal photographs
of eight black people (four men and four women) and eight white
people (four men–four women) from Nimstim face stimulus set
(Tottenham et al., 2009) that represented the trustees. Faces were
matched on attractiveness and trustworthiness as reported by
28 independent participants (10 men and 18 women, all whites;
mean aged 32.68, SD = 6.56) in an online questionnaire using
Qualtrics®2. All stimuli were presented against a gray background
2There was neither a significant difference in attractiveness between the two
ethnic faces t(27) = 1.64, p = 0.11; Alphaforalltheblackfaces_attractiveness = 0.79,
mean= 2.67, SD= 0.61; Alphaforallwhitefaces_attractiveness = 0.81; mean= 2.51,
SD = 0.57; nor a significant difference in trustworthiness t(27) = 0.19,
p = 0.85; Alphaforalltheblackfaces_trustworthiness = 0.77, mean = 2.93, SD = 0.52;
Alphaforallwhitefaces_trustworthiness = 0.71; mean= 2.91, SD= 0.50.
(see Figure 1). Each trial started with a 200 ms presentation of
“€” (2.1  1.6° visual angle) to indicate the money given to the
participant, that was replaced by a fixation point (+, 0.7  0.7°
visual angle) for 500 ms, and was followed by the picture of the
trustee for that trial (6.2  8.3° visual angle) for 1500 ms. During
this time, participants had to indicate whether to keep (by pressing
the “0” key) or share (by pressing the “1” key) the euro. After
participants informed of their decision (or after 1500 ms in case
they did not so), the picture was replaced by the fixation point
for 500 ms and then replaced by a symbolic feedback symbol
(1.0°  1.0° visual angle) which indicated the trustee’s decision
for that trial. Three possible symbols displayed in three different
colors were used as feedback: a green “o”, a navy “#”, and a maroon
“*”. Their meanings were: “You have decided to keep the money.
You receive 1 euro. Your partner receives 0 euro”; “You have
decided to share and your partner has decided to reciprocate”;
“You have decided to share and your partner has decided not to
reciprocate.” The association between specific symbols, color, and
their meaning was counterbalanced across participants3. On trials
where participants did not enter their decision on time (1.5 s), they
saw the message “¡tarde!” (late!). At the end of the trial a larger
fixation point (a “+” sign, 1.0°  1.0°) remained on the screen for
1000 ms.
Participant played a multi-round design, with 16 different
trustees over the course of the task. Participants played this game
40 times with each of the 16 trustees (for a total of 640 trials)
divided in two phases of five blocks each. Each phase was designed
so that three faces of an ethnic group were associated with a
high probability of reciprocation rate (75%) while three faces
of the other group were associated with a low probability of
reciprocation rate (25%). These were consistent faces. The forth
face of each group in each phase reciprocated at the rate of the
other group. These were inconsistent faces. In the second phase
the group reciprocation rate was inversed using four different
faces for each ethnic group. The order in which black or white
started reciprocating in 75% of the trials was counterbalanced
across participants. Which face of the group acted as inconsistent
face was also counterbalanced across participants. For instance,
for a given participant, five blocks constituted the first phase. In
3This procedure was used because in a follow up experiment we wanted to
evaluate evocated potentials associated to the feedback as have been previously
studied in Tortosa et al. (2013).
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block 1 reciprocation rate was allocated at 50% for every face of
both groups, whereas in blocks 2–5 the reciprocation rate was set
at 75% for three black trustees (consistent faces), and 25% for one
black trustee (inconsistent face), and 25% for three white trustees
(consistent faces) and 75% for one white trustee (inconsistent
face). In a second phase of five extra blocks, eight new faces were
presented and the reciprocation rates were inversed for the ethnic
groups. That is, in the sixth block the reciprocation rate would be
again set at 50% for both groups, but in blocks 7–10, three white
faces would reciprocate at a 75% rate while three black faces would
reciprocate at a 25% rate and one white face would reciprocate at
a 25% rate while one black face would reciprocate at a 75% rate.
Once the participants finished the trust game task they were
presented with the 16 faces and were asked to evaluate them using
a likert-scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much” in
what extent they were attractive and trustworthy. We also asked
participants to indicate how distinctive the face was compared
to the other members of its group, using a likert-scale ranging
from  3 (very distinctive) to +3 (very undistinctive), and how
frequently each face was presented compared to the others (1
“less,” 2 “the same,” 3 “more”). We also included some general
questions about the group level, including % of reciprocation and
% presentation of whites and blacks.
RESULTS
We analyzed the proportion of participants’ sharing/cooperation
rates across conditions. First, we compared cooperation rate
toward black and white trustees in the first block of the first
phase (where there was no manipulation of group reciprocation
rate, 50%). There was no significant difference in participants
cooperationwith black (mean= 0.68; SD= 0.16) vs. white trustees
(mean= 0.63; SD= 0.19), t(25) = 1.45, p= 0.16.
In order to measure the categorization or individuation
strategies in participants’ cooperation behavior, we analyzed it
separately for each ethnic group and faces’ level of consistency
(consistent or inconsistent with their respective category). Thus,
cooperation rates were introduced into an ANOVAwith ethnicity
(black, white), block (2–5), group reciprocation rate (25%,
75%), and face consistency (consistent, inconsistent) as within-
subject factors. Result showed that participants, contrary to the
social categorization hypothesis, decided to cooperate equally
independently of the trustee’s ethnicity, F(1,25) = 0.69, p = 0.41,
!2p = 0.03, that is, they did not cooperate with white trustees more
than with black trustees. The main effect of Face consistency was
neither significant, F(1,25) = 0.02, p= 0.90, !2p = 0.00.
However, and according to our predictions, participants
significantly preferred to cooperate with the group associated to
high reciprocity (M = 66.7%, CI: 61.4–72.0) as compared to the
one associated to low reciprocity (M = 61.9%, CI: 56.0–67.9),
F(1,25) = 13.39, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.35. This effect of Group
Reciprocation rate was significantly moderated by block and Face
Consistency, as shown by the three-way interaction between these
three factors, F(1,25)= 4.23, p= 0.008, !2p = 0.15. The interaction
showed that the effect of group reciprocation rate (which was
opposite for inconsistent faces) increased across blocks, as
learning increased. Thismakes evident the reinforcement learning
hypothesis (Chang et al., 2010) by which participants update their
previous impressions with the acquired knowledge of reciprocity
rate of each face.
More interestingly, the Ethnicity by Group reciprocation rate
interaction was significant, F(1,25) = 5.17, p = 0.03, !2p = 0.17,
and was significantly moderated by the Ethnicity  Group
Reciprocation  Face consistency three-way interaction, which
was also significant, F(1,25) = 10.47, p = 0.003, !2p = 0.30.
Importantly, contrary to our predictions, a significant Group
Reciprocation rate by Face Consistency interaction was observed
for black trustees, F(1,25) = 6.92, p = 0.01, !2p = 0.22, while
the same interaction was not significant for white trustees,
F(1,25) = 0.70, p = 0.41, !2p = 0.03 (see Figure 2). That is,
while black trustees led to cooperation responses as a function
of the faces’ individual cooperation rates (as they were opposite
for inconsistent faces), in the case of the white trustees the
participant’s cooperation behavior was guided by the cooperation
rate of the group, independently of the individual cooperation rate
(i.e., independently of face consistency). As the same cooperation
responses for consistent and inconsistent faces can be conceived
as a sign of categorization, and opposite cooperation behaviors
for consistent vs. inconsistent faces as a sign of individuation,
these interactions indicated that black trustees were individuated
whereas white trustees were categorized.
Trustees’ Evaluations
We checked for individual differences of the faces. Specifically,
first we wanted to evaluate how the trust game task could have
affected judgments of attractiveness and trustworthiness of the
trustees. We then performed a repeated measure analysis (two
group reciprocation rate by two ethnicity by two face consistency)
on each dependent variable. We did not find any significant
effect nor interaction for attractiveness, Fs(1,25) < 2.8, ps > 0.11.
Trustworthiness ratings only revealed a significant interaction
effect for Ethnicity by Face Consistency, F(25) = 4.57, p = 0.04,
!2p = 0.16, indicating that consistent black trustees were evaluated
as more trustworthy (mean = 3.9; SD = 1.61) than inconsistent
black trustees (mean = 3.5; SD = 1.53). However, inconsistent
white trustees were evaluated as more trustworthy (mean = 3.7;
SD= 1.10) than consistentwhite trustees (mean= 3.4; SD= 1.32).
All other Fs(1,25) < 2.5, ps> 0.14.
Then we analyzed how distinctive (very distinctive  3 to very
undistinctive +3) each individual faces was in comparison with
the ingroup faces. The only significant effect was the Group
Reciprocation rate by Ethnicity interaction, F(25)= 4.24, p= 0.05,
!2p = 0.15. The result showed that black trustee associated with
low reciprocation rates were perceived as more similar to each
other (mean = 1.07; SD = 1.47) than those associated to high
reciprocation rates (mean= 0.89; SD= 1.41) while white trustees
were perceived as more similar to each other when associated
to high group reciprocation rates (mean = 0.96; SD = 1.46)
compared to low group reciprocation rates (mean = 0.67;
SD = 1.62). None of the other effects reached significance,
Fs(1,25) < 1, ps > 0.35. Next we perform the same analysis
to evaluate the perception of the frequency of individual faces
presentation (1 “less,” 2 “the same,” 3 “more” compared to the
rest). None of the effects were significant, Fs(1,25)< 1.5, ps> 0.22.
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FIGURE 2 | Means of participants’ cooperation rate toward black and white trustees for each group and face consistency’ level of reciprocation.
We next evaluated how participants perceived the faces at
a group level. We first analyzed how frequently participant
believed that the two groups of faces (blacks and whites) were
presented during the task. There was no significant differences in
their estimates of the overall presentation rates of black trustees
(mean = 56.15%; SD = 12.11%) compared to white trustees
(mean = 51.92%; SD = 15.43), t(25) = 1.10, p = 0.28, !2p = 0.01.
This result indicates that participants correctly estimated that all
faces were equally presented throughout the experiment. Then we
evaluated participants’ impression about the reciprocation rates
of black and white trustees. Interestingly, we found a significant
difference in overall reciprocation’ judgments depending on the
ethnicity of the trustee, t(25) = 2.95, p = 0.005, !2p = 0.26.
Participants reported they thought that black trustees reciprocated
more often (mean = 60.58%; SD = 13.44) than white trustees
(mean= 48.50%; SD= 16.00).
DISCUSSION
The present study explored the effect of ethnicity and consistent
vs. inconsistent behaviors (reciprocation rates) regarding their
identity group in a multi-round trust game task. We wanted to
explore whether ethnicity moderates the decision of whether to
cooperate with partners or not and, more importantly, whether
social categorization or individuation processes would underlie
those decisions. Results revealed that participants did not show a
particular bias toward cooperating with white compared to black
in general, although, interestingly, they used different strategies
to make decisions about how to cooperate (share money) or not
with white and black partners. Whereas the observed pattern
of results led us to conclude that the white ingroup trustee’s
faces were categorized (i.e., the same cooperation pattern was
observed for consistent and inconsistent faces), the black outgroup
trustee’s faces were individuated (i.e., an opposite pattern
of cooperation was observed for consistent and inconsistent
faces).
Even though preferences to cooperate with ingroup members
more than with outgroup members have been largely reported in
previous research (Wilson and Kayatani, 1968; Tanis and Postmes,
2005; Chang et al., 2010), other studies’ results go in opposite
direction, that is, favoring outgroup members (see Allport, 1954;
Monteith et al., 2002; Tortosa et al., 2013, study 2). However,
our results did not show any bias neither for black nor for white
trustees as measured in block 1 (50% reciprocation rate for both
black and white trustees). This finding is in line with previous
results by Stanley et al. (2011) which show that unless participants
had a strong pro-whites or pro-black bias, as measure with an
implicit ethnic attitudes test, their evaluation of trustworthiness
and their cooperation behavior (economic offers in a trust game)
kept similar toward black and white partners.
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We can rule out the possibility that black and white trustees
evoked different trustworthiness impression, as we controlled for
this (among other variables, e.g., attractiveness) with the pretest
for stimuli selection. The evaluation of the trustworthiness of the
stimuli at the end of the trust game did not show either overall
differences between black andwhite trustees, which go in linewith
the pretest and with other studies investigating ethnic attitudes
(Phelps et al., 2000; Stanley et al., 2011).
A potential explanation for the similar cooperation toward
partners belonging to both ethnic groups can be due to the
use of women and men as stimuli. It may exist a confound
between these two groups, so participants prefer to cooperate with
women more as they are perceived more trustworthy than men
(independently of their ethnic categorization, Buchan et al., 2008)
and consequently the gender bias may have concealed the ethnic
bias. This is surely a confound factor that should be carefully
analyzed by future research.
Interestingly, the manipulation of consistency significantly
affected the evaluation of trustworthiness, which may explain
the current results in our study. The different evaluation of
inconsistent black and white faces being the former more
positively evaluated regarding trustworthiness than the later may
evidence that people accepted more ingroup members (whites)
that behave unexpectedly compared to outgroup members
(blacks; Kosic et al., 2014).
Our main contribution to the study of ethnic categories and
decision-making literature focuses on the study of cooperation
strategies related to categorization and individuation processes.
Result showed that (white) participants used different strategies
to make decisions on how to cooperate (share money) with white
and black partners. Specially, they learnt which face is behaving
inconsistently with the rest of the group and decided how to
cooperate with this person accordingly to the specific cooperation
rate that he or she showed. That is, participants individuate
each trustee they were encountering with. Interestingly, however,
this individuation strategy applied exclusively to black faces
(outgroup members). Contrary, decisions to cooperate toward
white trustees followed a categorization strategy. That is,
participants took their decisions to cooperate with inconsistent
trustees as a function of the proportion of reciprocation
assigned to the majority of the white trustees (consistent
trustees).
The reason why participants categorize whites and individuate
blacks, contrary to our expectations, and to what was previously
shown (Hugenberg et al., 2010) is far from being clear. However,
it could be argued that participants may care about ingroup
identification (Castano and Yzerbyt, 1998); therefore, theymay be
motivated to preserve the homogeneity of the ingroup members
(Castano, 1999) producing the categorization effect observed for
white faces. Furthermore, according to interdependence theories,
participants may have individuated black faces given that their
outcomes (the money they could earn during the task) may
depend on their sharing behaviors (Ruscher and Fiske, 1990).
Participants may have paid special attention to black people to
compensate their dispositional behavior to categorize them and
by consequence they increased their attention to inconsistencies
among black partners. This increased attention may have helped
them to use the strategy to cooperate with each face according
to the individual reciprocation rate rather than the group
reciprocation rate.
Another alternative explanation comes from Collins et al.
(2011) model of learning phenomena, and concretely the
“blocking” (Kamin, 1968) explanation, explaining why people
learnt with different strategies about black and white partners.
“Blocking” might occurs for whites when a new proportion
of reciprocity (inconsistent-cue) is introduced alongside a
proportion of reciprocity (consistent-cue) whose meaning has
already been learned about the majority of the members of the
group. Because the perceptual information coming from the
inconsistent partner (white person) is redundant at the perceptual
level (providing no additional information beyond the original
cue), learning about it may have been blocked.
Interestingly, while blocking could explain the null effect (more
related to categorization for whites), highlighting could explain
the individuation effect for blacks. Highlighting occurs when a
person focuses extra attention on a cue that changes the meaning
of a previously learned cue, as happens when a learned association
is no longer correct when a new cue is added alongside a known
one (Kruschke, 2009). Another explanation to blocking from a
motivational perspective will indicate that for white participants it
is not enriching on amatter of novelty to learn about otherswhites,
but it is highly interesting to know about the outgroup, to avoid
threats (highlighting).
Unfortunately we do not have information about participants’
previous experience with black individuals, so future studies
should measure and control for it. Future research should
also focus in explaining the mechanism underlying the
individuation—categorization strategies chosen by the
participants, not only in economic games, but also in other social
interactions, such as prosocial behaviors. It will be also interesting
to know whether bottom-up (perceptual information) or top-
down (conceptual-stereotypes) processes influence judgmental
tasks. Previous research in gender-emotion stereotypes (Becker
et al., 2007) show that both top-down and bottom-up processes
can co-occur during people evaluation.
Another specific detail of our procedure is that another group
category apart from the ethnical group (i.e., gender) could be
salient, as half of the faces in each group were women whereas
the other half were men. Given that the majority of participants in
our study (all but one) were women this might have affected the
pattern of results. However, given that this occurred for the ethnic
groups it seems unlikely that it could explain the pattern of results.
Nevertheless, future research should control more carefully for
the presence/absence of different important category features
(ethnicity, gender, age, etc.).
It seems clear that future research is necessary to replicate
and consolidate the specific findings observed in the reported
study, and to better explain the observed pattern of results.
Nevertheless, and importantly, the current study has shown to
be a suitable tool to investigate the incidental generation and use
of categorization-individuation social cooperation processes. In
a previous study (Canadas et al., 2013), this general paradigm
showed to be also suitable to investigate these categorization-
individuation processes and their use underlying the implicit
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allocation of attentional control. We believe this paradigm could
be extended to the study of other situations where categorization
vs. individuation processes play an important role in social
interactions. Perhaps the individuation pattern observed for the
outgroup members might disappear whenever more than four
members from each category have to be tracked. Therefore, our
procedure might be useful to investigate the interplay between
using specific knowledge about our interaction with a particular
individual to predict his/her future behavior vs. using knowledge
we have about our previous interactions with other members of
the same group, and the boundary conditions for the use of one
process or the other.
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